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“On considère sa main sur la table, et il en résulte
toujours une stupeur philosophique. Je suis dans
cette main et je n’y suis pas”
Paul Valéry
1 In the epistolary debate between Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin about the
latter's essay “The Storyteller” (first published in 1936), Adorno warns his friend against
what he considers to be a dangerous tendency pervading the essay – an “undialectical
ontology of the body”. Significantly, he writes:
For  all  those  points  in  which,  despite  our  most  fundamental  and  concrete
agreement  in  other  matters,  I  differ  from  you  could  be  summed  up  and
characterized as an anthropological materialism that I cannot accept. It is as if for you
the human body represents the measure of all concreteness.1 
2 He directly links Benjamin's lack of ‘dialectics’ with his faith in the human body's ability
to function as the matrix of  revolutionary forces.  Adorno's  evaluation of  his  friend's
method (or  lack thereof)  is  debatable,  but,  notably,  he points  out  the importance of
corporeality in Benjamin's political theory. More recently, studies by Uwe Steiner, Irving
Wohlfarth,  Gerhard Richter  and Sigrid  Weigel  contributed to  an appreciation of  this
aspect of Benjamin's thought.2 Although Benjamin does not dedicate any complete text to
this theme, the human body and its representations play a pivotal role in his work – a
guiding thread connecting his fragments on anthropology, written in the late 1910s, and
his essays addressing processes of alienation in capitalist modernity, written in the 1930s.
The purpose of this paper is to show how Benjamin's later utopia of a revolutionary
“collective physis”,3 which bears witness to his distinctive reception of Marxist theory,
unfolds  a  line  of  thought  initiated  approximately  ten  years  earlier,  in  a  group  of
fragments wherein Benjamin sketches a peculiar phenomenology of embodiment. These
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early reflections on bodily awareness, clearly distinct from the analyses proposed by Max
Scheler  and  Edmund  Husserl,  enable  Benjamin  to  progressively  develop  a  theory  of
political  emancipation  grounded  on  a  critical  examination  of  collective  forms  of
embodiment.
 
I. Leib and Körper. Walter Benjamin's Phenomenology
of the Body
I.1. Elusive Identity
3 In  the  second  half  of  the  19th  century,  first  with  Arthur  Schopenhauer,  then  with
Friedrich Nietzsche, the body makes a decisive entrance on the German philosophical
scene.4 Though their approach is  different,  Schopenhauer and Nietzsche describe the
human  being  as  fundamentally  embodied  and  question  the  traditional  dualistic
conception which exiled the body in the sphere of  objects.  As a  philosophy student,
Walter Benjamin is soon confronted with the questions raised by the redefinition of the
problem of embodiment. As Uwe Steiner points out, during his time in Bern, Benjamin
followed a seminar taught by the philosopher and psychologist Paul Häberlin, entitled
“The Problem of Body and Soul”.5 Häberlin's view on the matter did not make a lasting
impression on Benjamin, yet the problem itself certainly triggered his interest. In the late
1910s and early 1920s, Benjamin writes a number of fragments addressing the experience
the human being makes of her own body (“Perception and Body”, “Death”, “On Love and
Related  Matters”,  “On  Horror”,  “Outline  of  the  Psychophysical  Problem”).  When
Benjamin writes these short texts, the question of the “lived body” (Leib), i.e. the body
experienced as pertaining to the ego, as belonging to the sphere of subjectivity, becomes
relevant.
4  The  first  philosophical movement  which  rigorously  deals  with  bodily  awareness  is
phenomenology, notably through the distinction it establishes between ‘lived body’ (Leib)
and physical body or ‘thing-body’ (Körper). The split of the body impacts the reflection on
identity, as the emergence of the ‘lived body’ on the fault line between the ego and the
world, directly questions the traditional division between thought and matter, subject
and object. Within the phenomenological movement itself, the first evaluations of this
shift in perspective were not unequivocal. In his major work published in 1916, Formalism
in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Value, Max Scheler stresses the importance of making “a
sharp distinction between "lived body" and "thing-body" [der "Leib" und der "Körper"]”.6
We can indeed perceive our body from the outside, as a thing belonging to the world – the
body is then given as Körper. By contrast, the body given to us in “inner perception”, the
body “independent of, and, in order of givenness, prior to […] any special kinds of outer
perception”, is called “Leib”.7 Our body appears to us both as Leib and as Körper, both as
the matrix of our life and as a thing. And yet this rift in perception does not entail a
cognitive rift, because 
there  exists  a  strict  and  immediate  unity  of  identity  between  the  inner
consciousness which everyone has ‘of’ the existence and the hereness [Befinden] of
the lived body […] and the outer perception of one's lived body (as the body-thing).8
5 Although ‘body-thing’  (Körper)  and ‘lived body’  (Leib)  do not share the same mode of
appearance, the undubitable fact of their identity prevails and safeguards the integrity of
the individual. According to Scheler, the body can thus never appear as alien to ourselves,
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even when its mode of appearance is that of an object (Körper). It is immediately given as
an inalienable part of our identity.
6 In the second book of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, written between 1912 and 1928 and
first published after his death, Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological
school, explores more profoundly the duality of the body, this “material thing of a certain
nature which […] makes up a fundamental component of the real givenness of the soul
and the Ego”.9 He remarks that our body perceived as physical body or thing (Körper)
never  appears  to  us  as  an  object  among  objects,  but  as  a  “remarkably  imperfectly
constituted thing”, since “certain of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only in a
peculiar perspectival foreshortening and others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisible to
me”.10 Husserl, more than Scheler, accounts for the specific mode of appearance of the
body  as  Körper.  As  an  incomplete,  misshapen  object,  it  remains  fundamentally
unknowable to the ego whose intentions it performs. Our inability to visually cognise and
recognise our own body is  nevertheless compensated by the sense of  touch,  through
which we can simultaneously feel  the deepness of  our body and the reliability of  its
epidermic surface. The “touch-sensings” compensate for the deficiency of sight, so that
the monstrous entity “manifests itself  immediately as my Body (Leib)”.11 Husserl,  like
Scheler, though in a more reflected manner, bridges the gap between Körper and Leib, 
between thing and “soul”, in order to ensure the ego's grip on its organ of perception and
movement.
7  Although he could not have read Husserl's text as it was not published at that time,
Benjamin's initial observation in “Perception and Body”, a fragment written in 1918, is
very similar to Husserl's note on the monstrous appearance of the lived body:
It is highly significant that our own body is in many ways inaccessible to us. We can
see neither our face, nor our back, nor our entire head, the primary part of our
body […]. We rise up into the world of perception with our feet, but not our head.12
8 Benjamin however, in contrast to Scheler and Husserl, does not try to recenter the ‘lived
body’ on the ego: he lets it disrupt the barrier between inside and outside, self and world,
subject and object. In a longer text, “Outline of the Psychophysical Problem”, Benjamin
emphasizes  the  tensions  running  through  the  body,  notably  the  one  between  the
centripetal and centrifugal senses: while touch, as a centripetal sense, makes us aware of
our body's limits, the centrifugal sense of sight literally opens us to our environment.
Indeed, the center of our center of perception, our face, is blind to itself: it is a hole
through which the world “breaks over us”,13 filling us with its invasive presence, catching
us in the ebb and flow of sensory stimuli. Benjamin insists on the “body's eccentricity”:14
as soon as our own body intrudes into our perceptual field, we are confronted with the
centrelessness of what we are accustomed to regard as our centre of perception. The
headless, anamorphic figure we suddenly see radically questions the hierarchies between
self and world by offering resistance to its assignation to the sphere of things (physical
body/Körper) as well as to the sphere of the ego (lived body/Leib). Scheler and Husserl do
not sufficiently question the coincidence between the body perceived as a thing (through
‘outer perception’ for Scheler, through sight for Husserl) and the body felt as a part of
ourselves (through ‘inner perception’ for Scheler, through touch for Husserl): in the end,
there is no doubt that physical body and lived body are one and the same entity, given to
us  through different  modes  of  appearance.  Benjamin,  on the  contrary,  stretches  the
relation between Körper and Leib until  it  breaks:  the  body becomes  the  place  where
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alienness (the object, the world, the outside) penetrates the sphere of the self and deeply
disturbs its structure. The fragment “On Horror”, written at the beginning of the 1920s,
revolves around the idea of a split  in the body,  experienceable in states of profound
absent-mindedness in which the spirit is pulled out of the body. What is left behind once
the lived body (Leib) is taken away with the spirit it belongs to, is the Körper – a body the
ego can neither recognize as a part of itself,  nor dismiss as a mere thing. The Körper
appears indeed as a “double”15 – a ghostly reduplication of myself which undermines the
foundation of identity, because it is neither me nor alien to me. In this hallucinatory
state, subjectivity is being haunted in its own territory by a presence that challenges its
autonomy – a presence it  represses but can never fully expel.  In Benjamin's peculiar
phenomenology, the body rooting the ego in the world is an unreliable, dual entity that
the subject can never completely appropriate.
 
I.2. Personal and Collective Body. Defining Ethical and Political
Categories
9 The  fragment  “Outline  of  the  Psychophysical  Problem”,  written  around  1922,  is
principally devoted to the distinction between Leib and Körper.  In this long fragment,
Benjamin decisively leaves behind the phenomenological concepts of ‘lived body’  and
‘thing-body’ and offers a new assessment of corporeality. Although he seems to begin
unsurprisingly with the polarity between the spiritual and the material (Geist and Leib),
Benjamin does  not  resort  to,  either,  a  dualistic,  or  a  unitarian interpretation of  the
relationship between body and mind, but postulates instead their radical identity. This
perspective makes the question of the link between body and mind – be it understood as
an antagonism or as a symbiosis – irrelevant: Geist and Leib are indeed one and the same
object. The distinction between the two modes of embodiment – Körper and Leib – is soon
revealed as  the relevant one.  The Leib has got  its  own temporality (the instant)  and
locality (shape). Both are marked by limitations. Yet the Leib is not to be confused with
the personal body, since it is not a “substratum”.16 It  materializes at the intersection
between  individual  life  and  historical  process,  thus  determining  the  human  being's
experience in historical time and bearing witness to the entanglement of individual life
with the collective process of history. The Körper, on the other hand, is described as the
“substance of  [ourselves]”:17 it  is absolutely ours and,  at  the same time,  exceeds our
perceptual faculty. Pain and pleasure, affects that are both diffuse and highly personal, 
make us aware of our Körper as a singular but limitless entity. Through the Körper, the
human  being is  linked  to  a transcendent  order,  which  Benjamin  defines  in  the
“Theological-Political Fragment” – thought to have been written around the same time –
as the “messianic order”, in opposition to the “profane order” of history.18 The distinction
that  Benjamin  institutes  between  Leib and  Körper is  grounded  in  the  distinction
established  in  the  “Theological-Political  Fragment”  between  history  and  theology,
profane  and  transcendent  order,  politics  and  ethics.  Ethics  concerns  the  bond  each
human  being  forms  with  transcendence;  its  specific  domain  must  therefore  be
distinguished from the sphere of politics, constituted by the immanent, collective process
of history.  Since history is  a matter of politics,  not of  eschatology,  ethics or religion
cannot function as the basis for the political community. What, then, can bind human
beings together and enable them to act collectively?
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10  The  clear  line  of  demarcation  drawn  between  the  profane,  shared  Leib and  the
transcendent, personal Körper allows Benjamin to develop an original theory of political
emancipation. In “Outline of the Psychophysical Problem”, Benjamin speaks indeed of the
dissolution of the individual Leib, making way for the constitution of the “body [Leib] of
mankind”.19 Politics thus does not address individuals, communities, nations or classes; it
concerns ‘mankind’ as a whole. This collective doesn’t arise from the organisation of a
coherent super-individuality binding together disparate individuals, but materializes as
the overcoming of the boundaries on which the traditional concept of individuality is
based: “In addition to the totality of all its living members, humanity is able partly to
draw nature, the nonliving, plant and animal, into this life of the body of mankind, and
thereby into this annihilation and fulfilment”.20 The collective “happiness”, which politics
must strive to achieve, is not a state of balance and harmony, but a paradoxical process of
decay and of blossoming. The “annihilation”, interpreted by Benjamin as a “fulfilment”, is
the “downfall” of  the self-sufficient individual.21 It  is  necessary for human beings,  as
individuals and as a species, to let go of the autarkic position they assume. The ‘Leib of
mankind’  thus  integrates  non-human  species  as  well  as  the  inorganic  elements  of
technology. Instead of conceiving of its body as the ideal of beauty and proportion and as
an immutable biological substrate, mankind should become aware of the plasticity of its
Leib. This collective body is indeed a constantly mutating whole, an expanding structure
without a centre of command: its anarchic growth does not imply an increase of power. In
the “Theological-Political Fragment”, Benjamin argues that political emancipation is not
about the constitution of a collective identity: it concerns a collective – a totality – that
emerges from the progressive disintegration of identity. Politics is not a process through
which order is created and boundaries are delineated: it is a movement that disrupts
structures and challenges hierarchies.
11  Benjamin’s daring phenomenology of the body announces the political writings of the
late  1920s  and  the  1930s.  The  phenomenological  approach  enables  Benjamin  to
concentrate on the peculiar experience of embodiment and to radically break with the
natural-scientific  conception  of  the  body  as  organism.  Benjamin  audaciously  draws
attention  to  the  body's  elusiveness:  he  does  not  seek  to  overcome  the  body's
‘eccentricity’, but instead exploits the rift that the splitting of the body as Leib and Körper
opens in the individual. His utopia of a collective Leib is built on the duplicitous nature of
a body that we cannot regard as the substratum of our identity, because it never fully
belongs  to  us.  Thereby,  Benjamin radically  defies  the reactionary organicism,  which,
facing the frail Weimar Republic, tries to present itself as the only viable proposition for a
coherent political community.
 
II. The Masses. Politicising the Body
II.1. The Anatomy of Modernity. Bodies without Egos
12 The  mutations  of  experience  in  capitalist  modernity  become  a  privileged  object  of
interest for Benjamin in the late 1920s and in the 1930s – a consequence of what he calls
his “conversion to political theory”22 – more precisely: to Marxism. Combining his lasting
interest  in  perception  with  a  political  analysis  of  economic  exploitation,  Benjamin
develops a dialectical  theory of  alienation and emancipation closely tied to his  early
phenomenology  of  embodiment.  Benjamin  daringly  wagers  that  the  processes of
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depersonalization grounded on coerced forms of alienation from the body can contribute
to  a  productive  form  of  “self-alienation”,23 paving  the  way  for  the  constitution  of
collective bodies and, thus, possibly leading to a radical movement of emancipation. 
13  One  of  the  leitmotivs  in  his  essay  “ On  Some  Motifs  in  Baudelaire”  is  the  “shock
experience”24 which structures the everyday perception of the human being immersed in
the “big-city crowd”.25 Submitted to a ceaseless flood of stimuli and forced to adapt to a
constantly changing environment,  human beings flowing through the crowd mobilize
their peripheral mimetic faculties to the detriment of their cognitive capacities:
Moving through [the  traffic  of  a  big  city]  involves  the  individual  in  a  series  of
shocks and collisions. At dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow through
him in rapid succession, like the energy from a battery.26
14 Edgar Allan Poe's short-story The Man of the Crowd, to which Benjamin devotes a chapter
of his essay on Baudelaire, describes from an overhanging standpoint the gesticulations
of  anonymous  passers-by,  who  seem  to  behave  like  semi-defective  automata,
mechanically  repeating  the  same  gestures.  “Technology  has  subjected  the  human
sensorium to a complex kind of training”27 – a training aiming at developing reflexes
rather  than  reflexivity.  Capitalism  knows  how  to  profit  from  this  ability  to  react
immediately to stimuli:
In working with machines, workers learn to coordinate ‘their own movements with
the uniformly constant movements of an automaton’.28
15 Economy  of  movements,  of  time,  of  space  is  the  key  to  efficiency,  so  that  every
superfluous mediation, slowing down the process of incorporation, has to be eliminated.
Indeed, efficiency does not rely on rational thinking, based on the understanding of the
whole system, but on the human being's ability to mimic gestures and to perform them
accurately  without  the  mediation  of  consciousness.  The  human  physis is  trained  to
resemble the infallible body of the robot, animated by no specific fears or desires, yet
always  ready  to  react.  Here  also  the  primary  eccentricity  of  the  human  body  is
reactivated: its ability to quickly adapt to new tasks relies on the splitting of the organic
unity into a series of functioning entities. When labour is segmented into a layout of
extremely simple and limited tasks, the best worker is the one who is able to master one
single gesture to perfection. This mastering can be achieved only through the dislocation
of the individual's body – privileging in each worker one body part and its resources to
the  detriment  of  the  body as  a  functioning whole.  The  trained body parts  are  then
reassembled  around  the  assembly  line,  which  secures  the  coherence  of  this  supra-
individual body. The intangible totality of the organism thus gives way to a strategically
constructed  mechanism  generating  profit.  The  social  and  economical  ‘training’  is
complete when the self and its biological substrate – the organism – are transcended into
the highly functional collective ‘body’ of factory workers. The structure of this body is
given by the planned segmentation of work, relayed by the means of production, each
machine making out  of  each gesture a  specific  step in the production process  –  the
conveyor belt serving as the spinal column. If each worker, as an isolated limb, cannot
grasp the shape of this new body, the engineers governing labour segmentation can.
16  The cross-reading of Georg Simmel's writings on the alterations of perception in late
modernity and of Karl Marx's analysis of the process of hybridisation between humans
and machines  in factories  allows Benjamin to develop a  critical,  historically  situated
reflection on the constitution of collective bodies in late modernity. Life in a capital – life
under  capitalism –  results  in  the  creation  of  collective  bodies;  not,  however,  in  the
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creation of collective egos. Exploitation is indeed based on the destruction of the workers'
physical  integrity and on the splitting of their psychophysical  unity:  the body of the
workers is organised, activated and controlled – possessed – by an extrinsic ego. Hence, in
History and Class-Consciousness (1923), Georg Lukács insists on the necessity for the workers
to build a class-consciousness establishing them as a collective subject – the proletariat –
a proposition widely accepted in the Marxist tradition. Benjamin makes concessions to
this interpretation,29 yet he also explores a different path. He does not look, primarily, for
the means to restore the psychophysical unity on a collective level, but rather seeks to
disclose the revolutionary potential of a collective body freed from its allegiance to the
ego –  of  a  radically  ‘eccentric’  body.  In  order  to  loosen the theoretical  bond linking
collective  bodies  to  collective  subjectivities,  he  takes  up  his  early  thoughts  on  the
fundamental heterogeneity between the self and the body and focuses on the self-less
collective bodies born in capitalist modernity. 
17  These anonymous bodies are designated by Benjamin as the masses. By resorting to the
equivocal,  seemingly  a-political  notion  of  mass,  Benjamin  attempts  to  overcome  the
representation of collective agents as collective subjects. Adorno praises this strategic
shift in a letter written a few months before the one containing the harsh criticism of his
friend's ‘undialectical ontology of the body’:
I  find  your  few  sentences  concerning  the  disintegration  of  the  proletariat  into
'masses'  through  the  revolution  to  be  amongst  the  most  profound  and  most
powerful statements of political theory I have encountered since I read State and
Revolution.30
18 What Adorno seems to miss is the link between Benjamin's theory of the revolutionary
masses and his reflection on corporeality, notably the link to his early observation of the
body's fundamental ‘eccentricity’. The masses Benjamin describes in The Arcades-Project,
in “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility”, and in his essay on
Baudelaire  are  not  bound together  by the awareness  of  sharing similar  features  and
pursuing  the  same  goals.  Yet  they  share  a  common  environment,  the  capitalist
metropolis, where they incorporated a series of reactions, enabling them to fluidly match
their movements without communicating and to fuse as a body without an ego.  Peter
Fenves  remarkably  sums  up  Benjamin’s  conception  of  the  masses  as  agents  without
strategies:
[they] solve [...] the tasks at hand without knowing what [they are] doing, indeed
without  realizing  that  there  are  tasks  in  the  first  place,  and above all,  without
recognizing [themselves] as such: as ‘the masses’.31 
19 Because they have no centre of command, an affect can suddenly spread in their bodies
through peripheral contagion and determine the course of collective action. In the short
text “Beautiful Dismay” (“Schönes Entsetzen”), describing the celebration of the 14th of
July in Paris, Benjamin portrays the passive crowd of onlookers as a dormant monster.
The  contradictory  affects  of  panic  and  delight  that  run through the  gathered  mass,
threaten to  wake the monster  and to  trigger  a  revolutionary outburst.32 The masses
indeed appear as “compact”, monolithic formations “only from the outside, in the minds of
its oppressors”,33 but from the inside of their bodies, they turn out to be formless, highly
unstable entities, loaded with energy and hypersensitive.
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II.2. Freeing the Body from its Image. Emancipation through
Distraction
20 Mapping the territory of the mass – giving an anatomy to this unpredictable, monstrous
body – becomes the key concern of the ones standing outside it. Benjamin analyses two
ways of giving a structure to the body of the mass, without ever explicitly linking them:
firstly, representing it as an allegory, i.e. as a collection of meaningful fragments, and,
secondly, portraying it as a closed organism. Allegorising the masses is the task of the
flâneur – a ‘type’ incarnated, in the eyes of Benjamin, by Charles Baudelaire. The flâneur
stands on the threshold of his class: a member of the bourgeoisie, he willingly gives up
the cosiness of his private home and dives into the masses. Yet he never fuses with them,
but,  rather,  tries  to  decipher  them like  a  mysterious  rebus.  As a  physiognomist  he
attempts  to  construct  a  symbolical  anatomy  of  the  mass  by  identifying,  through  a
dialectic of diversity and uniformity, several significant fragments in its body. When the
flâneur “goes botanizing on the asphalt”,34 he is driven by both aesthetical pleasure and
epistemological  interest.  August  Sander’s  portrait-atlas  of  the  society  of  the  Weimar
Republic, which Benjamin praises in his “Little History of Photography” (1931), can be
considered as a striking example of this fragmentation of the social body into a series of
visual  archetypes,  aiming  at  being  both  aesthetically  pleasurable  and  sociologically
relevant.  However,  the  flâneur’s  relationship  to  his  object  is  deeply  ambivalent:  his
distanced attitude is mingled with strong affects of fascination and repulsion. The masses
indeed do not only appear to him as an object of knowledge and of contemplation, but
also as a sexual fetish: the constantly exposed and yet elusive body of the masses mirrors
the way in which the commodity fuels the desire of the consumer. Because the mass-
produced commodity is multiplied to infinity, it can be bought by anyone but possessed
by no one: its inaccessibility is paradoxically based on its absolute availability. In this
respect,  the body of  the masses,  like the commodity,  constantly escapes the flâneur's
scrutinizing gaze – so that he “goes away empty-handed”,35 as did the baroque allegorist.
21  The flâneur’s  objectifying gaze – be it  pseudo-scientific,  aesthetical  or erotic – never
perceives the mass as a political agent. He does not interpret his ambiguous relationship
to  the  mass  as  the  reflection  of  socio-economical  antagonisms  and  is  therefore
fundamentally  unable  to  understand it.  According  to Benjamin,  this  is  not  the  case,
however, for the fascist leader, who, like the flâneur, tries to shape the body of the masses,
but with a decisively political purpose:
Fascism attempts to organize the newly proletarianized masses while leaving intact
the property relations which they strive to abolish.36
22 The  fascist  method  for  subduing  the  masses  rests  on  the  transfiguration  of  their
shapeless,  uncontrollable  body  into  a  closed  whole,  i.e.  into  a  recognizable,  strictly
outlined form endowed with an unalterable identity.  The fascist  propaganda does not
content itself with projecting the body of the dictator on every street-corner, in every
cinema, and in every household, it also enables the masses to “come face to face with
themselves” – to gain access to an image of themselves. “In great ceremonial processions,
giant rallies and mass sporting events”,37 fascism shapes the body of the masses as a
photogenic  face  and  then  offers  this  very  mass  its  own  image  as  an  object  of
contemplation. Originally a shapeless entity, it becomes a structured, autarkic totality
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under the fascist camera-eye. Fascinated and paralysed by its own image as by a caput
medusae, the “compact mass”38 is drained of its revolutionary energy.
23  Is  the  collective  body of  the  masses  destined to  fall  prey  to  the  normative  images
produced by fascist propaganda? Is the plastic body of mankind, which knows of no self
and no other, a dream made obsolete by the reality of the racist masses, keen on defining
themselves as biological organisms for which the other is always a parasite? Or can the
body's  ‘eccentricity’  be  won  for  the  revolution,  as  Benjamin  hopes?  In  his  essay  “
Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” (1929), Benjamin sketches –
in quite an enigmatic way – the political utopia of an ‘image space’ (Bildraum) becoming a
‘body  space’  (Leibraum).  This  transformation  of  a  representational  space  into  an
immanent lived space is meant to lead to the “bodily innervation” of the revolutionary
masses, which is defined by Benjamin as 
the space,  in  a  word,  in  which political  materialism and physical  creatureliness
share the inner man, the psyche, the individual, or whatever else we wish to throw
to them, with dialectical justice, so that no limb remains untorn.39 
24 Benjamin describes here a symbolical dismemberment through which the human being's
own body abolishes its centre and overthrows the established hierarchies between psyche
and body, inside and outside, self and other. The only images able to activate the body's
‘eccentricity’ are haptic images mobilising the tension between the senses of touch and
sight. The human being’s environment must become a paradoxically tactile ‘image space’
delivering intoxicating visual  shocks.  Benjamin's passionate interest in photomontage
and film editing has to be understood in this  context:  these processes create images
which do not rely on a passive and concentrated reception, but on a distracted one.
25  “Reception in distraction”40 is a keyword in Benjamin's theory of a political aisthesis. It 
has  to  be  understood  according  to  the  polysemy  of  the  German  word  Zerstreuung,
meaning both a lack of concentration and a spatial scattering: the sensations of physical
dislocation  and  of  psychical  distraction  condition  one  another.  In  this  respect,  Walt
Disney's or Charlie Chaplin's films produce the opposite effect of the fascist propaganda.
Instead of giving the collective body of moviegoers a ‘face’ – a recognisable identity –
these films produce collective reactions –  typically  laughter –  which bind the public
together on an affective level without resorting to a normative schema. What is narrated
on screen is of little importance, it is actually the formal principle of montage which
produces  images  full  of  internal  tensions. Overcoming the  visual,  i.e.  representative,
paradigm, these haptic images contribute to the ‘bodily innervation’ of the collective by
creating shared physical  reactions that  disrupt  the organic shell  of  the individual.  A
distracted mass is  not a set  of  scattered individuals,  but an anarchic,  shapeless body
without an ego. Neither subject nor object,  this body can, in Benjamin's mind, be the
matrix of a truly revolutionary movement, because, escaping every attempt at artistic




26 The core of Walter Benjamin's theory of emancipation resides in his attempt to think of
self-alienation – of alienation from the self – as potentially productive. The disintegration
of the ego's organic substrate, induced by capitalist conditions of production and modern
living  conditions,  makes  way  for  the  constitution  of  ‘eccentric’  collective  bodies,
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irreconcilable with the organicist model of the individual defined by a precise structure
and stable identity. Because he conceives of emancipation not as a process of individual
enlightenment,  but  as  a  sudden,  collective  movement,  Benjamin  abandons  the  key
concepts of the philosophies of consciousness, whose centre of gravity is the subject. The
‘anthropological materialism’, which Adorno feels so uncomfortable with, does not rely
on  a  blind  faith  in  the  agency  of  the  body,  but  on  the  critical  phenomenology  of
embodiment that Benjamin first sketched in the late 1910s. Unlike Scheler and Husserl,
however, Benjamin stresses the fundamental ‘eccentricity’ of the human being's body,
which undermines every attempt to conceive of the body as a closed entity centred on the
‘self’. The body, split between the ‘lived body’ (Leib) and the ‘thing-body’ (Körper), torn
between the ego and the world, disrupts the boundaries of the supposedly autonomous
individual.  Benjamin  conceives  of  the  revolutionary  collective  according  to  this
unpresentable model: not as a collective subject but as a collective body – as a plastic
entity whose political agency relies on its ability to virtually incorporate everyone and
everything.
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ABSTRACTS
In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Walter Benjamin writes a set of fragments providing an original
insight into bodily awareness and embodiment. Rejecting the natural-scientific conception of the
body as organism, Benjamin implicitly resorts to the phenomenological method to grasp this
elusive ‘object’, which pertains to the ego (as ‘lived body’ - Leib) and to the world (as ‘thing-body’
- Körper). Yet, contrary to Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl, Benjamin does not try to bridge the
gap between the objective and subjective modes of appearance of the body. He instead exploits
the rift that the philosophical splitting of the body opens in the individual in order to overcome
the  boundaries  on  which  the  concept  of  identity  is  grounded.  This  early  phenomenology  of
embodiment sheds light on Benjamin's distinctive reception of Marxism, notably on the utopia of
a revolutionary collective physis sketched in the late 1920s and in the 1930s.
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